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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 










OSARHIEME UYI OBAYGBONA,  
AKA Uyi Obaygbona,  




On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey  
(No. 2-11-cr-00299-004) 
District Judge:  Honorable William J. Martini 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 13, 2013 
 
Before:  MCKEE, Chief Judge, FUENTES, and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: February 27, 2014) 
 




OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
After a two-week trial, a jury convicted Osarhieme Obaygbona of conspiring to 
commit wire fraud, conspiring to commit identity theft, and conspiring to commit 
unauthorized computer access. Obaygbona appeals from his criminal conviction and 
sentence. He attacks the District Court’s instructions to the jury, the prosecutor’s 
argument at summation, and the calculation of his U.S. Sentencing Guidelines range. As 
none of these challenges has merit, we affirm Obaygbona’s conviction and sentence. 
I. Background 
Obaygbona, working with others, withdrew money from the bank accounts of 
strangers. The scheme was simple, but effective. A member of the conspiracy would 
obtain the personal information of a target and pass the target’s information to 
Obaygbona. Obaygbona would use the information to access the target’s bank accounts 
by internet or telephone. Obaygbona or another member of the conspiracy would then 
dispatch a runner to the bank to pose as the target and withdraw funds from the target’s 
account. Afterwards, Obaygbona would verify the details of the transaction with the 
bank.  
The government and Obaygbona presented their cases during a two-week trial. 
The jury found that Obaygbona conspired to commit wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1349; conspired to commit identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028(f); and 
conspired to gain unauthorized access to computers, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(b).  
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At sentencing, the District Court found that enhancements increased Obaygbona’s 
Guidelines offense level. Among them, the District Court estimated that the scheme 
resulted in actual or intended losses in excess of $70,000. Accordingly, the District Court 
applied an 8-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(E). The District 
Court also estimated that the number of victims exceeded 50. Accordingly, the District 
Court applied a 4-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(B). Based on 
those findings, and others relating to the nature of the fraud, Obaygbona’s role, and 
Obaygbona’s prior criminal history, the District Court calculated Obaygbona’s 
Guidelines range as 63 to 78 months. The District Court sentenced Obaygbona to 70 
months’ imprisonment for conspiracy to commit wire fraud, 70 months’ imprisonment 
for conspiracy to commit identity theft, and 30 months’ imprisonment for conspiracy to 
gain unauthorized access to computers. The District Court ordered that all three sentences 
were to be served concurrently. 
Obaygbona appealed, challenging both his conviction and his sentence.  
II. Conviction 
Obaygbona contends that we must overturn his conviction for three reasons. First, 
the District Court improperly omitted an overt act requirement from its jury instructions 
regarding the elements of conspiracy. Second, the District Court inadequately instructed 
the jury regarding wire fraud. Third, the District Court failed to declare a mistrial after 
the government prejudicially commented on Obaygbona’s decision not to testify at trial. 1 
None of these perceived errors merits reversal. 
                                              
1
 Because Obaygbona raised none of these issues before the District Court, we review for plain 
error. See United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 262-64 (2010); United States v. Brown, 254 
F.3d 454, 458, 463 (3d Cir. 2001) (unpreserved objection to prosecutor’s summation). Under 
plain error review, an appellate court may correct an error only when the appellant demonstrates 
there is an error, the error is clear or obvious, the error affected the appellant’s substantial rights, 
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First, when the District Court instructed the jury regarding conspiracy, it did not 
plainly err in omitting an overt act requirement. The text of the relevant statute, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1349, does not expressly require an overt act requirement, so it likely contains none. 
See Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S. 209, 213 (2005). Indeed, Obaygbona’s trial 
counsel, when asked by the District Court, agreed that § 1349 contained no overt act 
requirement. In any event, we need not decide the issue. Whether a § 1349 conspiracy 
requires an overt act is, at the very least, “subject to reasonable dispute” and therefore not 
plain error. See Marcus, 560 U.S. at 262. 
Second, the District Court did not commit plain error by omitting a detailed 
instruction on the meaning of an interstate wire. According to Obaygbona, the District 
Court failed “to give the jury the necessary clarifying instruction on what” it means to 
transmit a writing, signal, or sound by means of a wire, radio, or television 
communication. (Obaygbona Br. 37.) But Obaygbona did not dispute at trial that the 
conspiracy involved interstate wire communications. Accordingly, any further instruction 
to the jury about of the meaning of a “wire” would not have had any reasonable 
probability of affecting the trial’s outcome. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 
(1993).  
Third, the Government did not make a constitutionally impermissible comment on 
his silence during the trial. Obaygbona contends that the prosecutor violated 
Obaygbona’s Fifth Amendment rights by describing certain evidence as “not in dispute.” 
(Obaygbona Br. 42.) In particular, the prosecutor described the existence of the identity 
theft ring, the ring’s use of fake IDs, and the ring’s focus on making fraudulent 
withdrawals as “not even in dispute.” App’x 924. The prosecutor’s language, however, 
                                                                                                                                                  
and the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. 
Marcus, 460 U.S. at 262. 
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does not appear to have been “manifestly intended” or “of such character that the jury 
would naturally take it to be a comment on the failure of the accused to testify.” Cf. 
Brown, 254 F.3d at 463 (quoting Bontempo v. Fenton, 692 F.2d 954, 958 (3d Cir. 1982)). 
Accordingly, the District Court had no obligation to declare a mistrial.  
III. Sentence 
Obaygbona next challenges two aspects of the District Court’s Guidelines 
calculation. First, Obaygbona contends that the District Court miscalculated the actual or 
intended loss cause by his conduct. Second, Obaygbona challenges the District Court’s 
factual finding that the victims numbered at least 50.
2
 We reject both arguments. 
The District Court did not commit clear error when it determined that Obaygbona 
caused losses in excess of $70,000. The District Court had before it evidence showing the 
identity theft conspiracy caused actual or intended losses in excess of $120,874. 
Obaygbona does not dispute this. Rather, he asserts that much of the loss ought to be 
attributed to other members of the conspiracy, not to him, because his co-conspirators 
used the stolen information to withdraw money from more banks than Obaygbona 
instructed them to visit. Having provided fake identities to his co-conspirators for the 
purpose that they use them to make unauthorized bank withdrawals, however, 
Obaygbona cannot disclaim responsibility when his collaborators used the same tactics at 
other banks. We credit the District Court’s conclusion that these losses were reasonably 
foreseeable to Obaygbona. Therefore, the District Court reasonably found facts that 
supported an 8-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(E). 
                                              
2
 We review a district court’s interpretation of the Guidelines de novo. We review a district 
court’s factual findings for clear error. We accord a district court’s application of its factual 
findings to the Guidelines with due deference. See United States v. Richards, 674 F.3d 215, 218-
23 (3d Cir. 2013). 
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The District Court did not commit clear error when it estimated that the number of 
victims numbered at least 50. The District Court found Obaygbona’s offense “involved 
50 or more victims” and thus increased the Guideline offense-level by 4 levels. U.S.S.G. 
§ 2B1.1(b)(2)(B). Obaygbona contends that the District Court ought to have counted only 
those individuals whose identifying information Obaygbona and his co-conspirators used 
to commit fraud. Had Obaygbona merely possessed or transferred identifying 
information, he perhaps would not have “used” that information within the meaning of 
§ 2B1.1. See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 704 F.3d 1317, 1321 (11th Cir. 2013). But the 
trial record shows that the conspirators accessed the private financial accounts of more 
than 40 persons, in addition to at least 10 persons whose accounts they had plundered or 
credentials they had forged. Thus, the District Court did not clearly err when it concluded 
that Obaygbona’s conduct affected at least 50 victims.  
IV. Conclusion 
We affirm Obaygbona’s conviction and sentence. The District Court did not 
commit plain error in instructing the jury about conspiracy or wire fraud. Nor did it allow 
the government to improperly comment on Obaygbona’s silence. Nor did it err when it 
found that Obaygbona’s conduct caused more than $70,000 in losses and affected more 
than 50 victims.  
